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Abstract
Decrypting and inspecting encrypted malicious communications may assist crime detection and prevention. Access to client or
server memory enables the discovery of artefacts required for decrypting secure communications. This paper develops the MemDe-
crypt framework to investigate they discovery of encrypted artefacts in memory and applies the methodology to decrypting the
secure communications of virtual machines. For Secure Shell, used for secure remote server management, file transfer, and tun-
nelling inter alia, MemDecrypt experiments rapidly yield AES-encrypted details for a live secure file transfer including remote user
credentials, transmitted file name and file contents. Thus, MemDecrypt discovers cryptographic artefacts and quickly decrypts live
SSH malicious communications including detection and interception of data exfiltration of confidential data.
Keywords: network traffic; decryption; memory analysis; IoT; Android; VMI; Secure Shell; SSH; AES; Secure File Transfer; data
exfiltration; insider attacks;
1. Introduction
Decrypting malicious communications offers opportunities
to discover useful information. This could include botnet com-
mand and control traffic identifying compromised machines,
confidential information that has been extracted and sent or up-
loaded to an external location, ransomware keys, or details of
criminal activity [1]. This paper focuses on decrypting Secure
Shell (SSH) traffic, a potential medium for data exfiltration [2].
Realistically useful decryption methods require a knowledge of
both the algorithm and the cryptographic artefacts used. En-
cryption techniques based only on algorithmic secrecy may be
unreliable, as mechanisms such as reverse-engineering enable
the algorithm’s functionality to be discovered and furthermore,
without extensive independent verification, the robustness of an
encryption algorithm may be weak [3]. As a result, publicly
known encryption algorithms are commonly used, and key se-
crecy thus becomes paramount. Generating sufficiently long
random blocks as keys makes decryption unlikely using brute
force methods.
To decrypt, a framework must discover keys and other cryp-
tographic artefacts. When software applications perform en-
cryption and decryption, the artefacts reside in program mem-
ory at that moment, whether on the program stack, in the heap,
or in shared memory. As memory access is important to foren-
sic investigations [4] software tools and libraries already exist
to support such capability for technologies such as desktops,
servers, the Internet of Things (IoT), Android smartphones,
and virtualized environments. Mechanisms to discover cryp-
tographic artefacts in memory in a manner that allows the tar-
get device to continue to operate normally during an investi-
gation while remaining undetectable is of particular interest.
This paper presents the MemDecrypt framework that stealthily
decrypts secure communications traffic. Although earlier re-
searchers have discovered encryption keys in device memory,
other cryptographic artefacts, commonly required to decrypt
secure traffic, are not considered. MemDecrypt implements a
novel approach to decrypting SSH traffic by analyzing target
memory extracts to identify these candidate cryptographic arte-
facts (initialization vectors) that, in turn, enable rapid location
of candidate keys and the deciphering of payloads in live ses-
sions with high probability. This enables malicious SSH ac-
tivity in live secure communications sessions to be addressed.
The techniques proposed are applicable to a range of device
platforms, though the MemDecrypt framework is particularly
focused on decrypting communications from within virtual ma-
chines.
Although plaintext could be obtained by adding an audit
function to the binary, this is arguably a different application
and has some similarity with a key logger, which may only be
acceptable in specific environments. Also, unless all plaintext is
captured rather than client input, file contents are not obtained.
Plaintext could possibly be obtained by extracting on buffer
memory writes. However, researchers have found that monitor-
ing virtual machine read/write buffers is inefficient. As mem-
ory extraction is invasive minimizing the number of extracts is
preferable so with buffer memory write triggers, the larger the
exfiltrated file, the more extracts. To discover the plaintext of
a full session, buffer breaks would need to be in place before
the session. In MemDecrypt, memory can be extracted at any
stage after the handshake completes to decrypt a captured net-
work session. Buffer memory write triggers may be effective
with interactive sessions as with exfiltrated data, missing an ex-
tract makes decryption problematic. Furthermore, exfiltrating
non-ASCII data may be more challenging without certainty of
buffer memory locations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. To provide
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framework context, the background to secure communications
is provided in Section II. Earlier research in discovering crypto-
graphic artefacts is reviewed in Section III. Section IV presents
the MemDecrypt design and Section V the implementation de-
tails. Test results are evaluated and discussed in Section VI and
conclusions drawn in Section VII.
2. Related Work
This section provides a summary of symmetric encryption in-
cluding block and stream algorithms commonly used in secure
communications protocols. Approaches for accessing memory
to support cryptographic artefact discovery are also discussed.
Although there is no published research into finding crypto-
graphic artefacts in Android smartphone and IOT device mem-
ory, desktop and server memory has been studied. Entropy
measures have frequently been used as a filtering mechanism to
discover keys. This approach assisted in searches for AES key
schedules after cold-boot attacks [5] as well in finding Skipjack
and Twofish algorithm artefacts [6]. These studies focus on en-
cryption key discovery in dormant devices and therefore do not
decrypt the secure network sessions of live virtual machines.
Although malware analysis and detection has been a research
focus for monitoring from outside the virtual machine, it has
also been applied to analyze secure communications. For ex-
ample, SSH session details were obtained from an SSH hon-
eypot server customized to extract data when the specific sys-
tem calls executed [7]. In TLSkex [8], AES-CBC cryptographic
keys were discovered in Linux client virtual machine memory
when Change Cipher Spec messages were detected in TLS net-
work sessions by searching for bit strings where the counts of
0’s and 1’s suggested randomness. TLSkex investigates TLS
traffic only so, for example, the uploading of confidential data
using SSH is not considered. Furthermore, TLSkex analysis is
restricted to Linux virtual machine so Windows virtual machine
activity is excluded. The MemDecrypt framework decrypts en-
tire sessions for both SSH and TLS protocols where different
encryption algorithms have been applied for Windows clients
and Linux servers using a standard entropy measure. Moreover,
MemDecrypt memory extractions are independent of message
type and discovery of candidate initialization vectors drives the
decryption process.
Encryption keys can be discovered by intercepting encryp-
tion function calls to extract parameters. For example, the
Linux ptrace command can attach to the encrypting process
enabling identification of keys and other artefacts [9]. This
approach may have been used to discover SSH plaintext, ci-
phertext, and keys, although implementation details are unclear
[10]. These approaches are Linux-specific and are easily de-
tectable by virtual machine software. Consequently, they may
not be effective against malicious insiders, especially when the
target device runs Windows. Ptrace or the related strace can
also monitor server system calls to extract SSH plaintext al-
though this presumes control of the server and rapidity of trac-
ing both of which may be problems in live scenarios. MemDe-
crypt decrypts SSH network sessions in a stealthy manner by
triggering memory extracts only when an unusual event is de-
tected.
2.1. Encryption algorithms
Encryption algorithms for secure communications are asym-
metric or symmetric. For encryption and decryption, asym-
metric algorithms use different keys whereas symmetric algo-
rithms use the same keys. Asymmetric algorithms attain se-
curity through computational complexity, which takes proces-
sor time, making them considerably less CPU efficient than
symmetric algorithms [11]. Consequently, asymmetric algo-
rithms are frequently only used for agreement on symmetric
keys, which are then used to encrypt the channel. Symmet-
ric encryption algorithms are either stream algorithms, where
plaintext is encrypted with either bit-by-bit or block algorithms
(where blocks of a specific size are encrypted). Although the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block algorithm may be
the gold standard, vulnerability and performance concerns have
led to the adoption of ChaCha20 stream algorithm with Poly-
1305 authentication [12] in secure protocols such as OpenSSH
and OpenSSL, as well as being used for Google Chrome related
communications on Android smartphones [13].
Block and stream algorithms commonly require initialization
vectors (IVs) for secure communications. For AES, IVs incor-
porated in the encryption process provide defenses against re-
play attacks [14]. For example, in AES counter mode (AES-
CTR), an IV is encrypted and XORed with the plaintext to
produce ciphertext. AES-CTR is the quickest AES mode, and
is recommended by security experts [3] [15]. For ChaCha20,
the key, IV, and a counter are parameters to keystream creation
[12]. The keystream is XORed with the plaintext to produce ci-
phertext. Both AES-CTR and ChaCha20 are approved for SSH
[16] and TLS protocols. Consequently, encryption keys and
IVs must be discovered to decrypt AES-CTR and ChaCha20
encrypted SSH and TLS channels.
This paper focuses on SSH communications. For SSH in
AES-CTR mode, the IV increments by 1 for each outgoing
plaintext block [17] so that the difference between the IV for the
first plaintext block in packets n+1 and n is the number of plain-
text blocks in packet n. Although AES-CTR is the only rec-
ommended SSH AES mode [16], AES-CBC is also used. For
AES-CBC, each IV after the initial value is the ciphertext of the
previous block [17]. Consequently, the IV for each encrypted
AES-CBC block is known. ChaCha20 uses the IV to generate
key streams. It performs 20 rounds of mathematical operations
starting from a base structure consisting of a constant string of
16 bytes, a generated 32-byte key, a 4-byte counter, and a 12-
byte IV, where the counter is typically 0 or 1 for each 64-byte
plaintext block [12].
SSH enables secure management of remote servers across
potentially insecure networks, offering functionality such as
client-server file transfer. The protocol is specified in 4 key
IETF RFCs: SSH Protocol Architecture (SSH-ARCH) [18],
SSH Transport Layer Protocol (SSH-TRANS)[19], SSH Au-
thentication Protocol (SSH-AUTH) [20], and the SSH Connec-
tion Protocol (SSH-CONNECT) [21]. SSH-TRANS defines
the initial connection, packet protocol, server authentication,
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and the basic encryption and integrity service [22]. Following
the TCP handshake, the parties transmit supported SSH pro-
tocol versions, and optionally application, which enables the
probable operating systems and library to be inferred. For in-
stance, ’SSH-2.0-PuTTY_Release_0.70’ probably signifies that
a Windows client is executing the PuTTY application [23].
Exchanged ’Key Exchange Initialization; and ’Key Exchange’
messages determine the session encryption and authentication
algorithm and the material for the generation of the crypto-
graphic artefacts. Client New Keys messages advises that all
subsequent traffic in the session is encrypted. An example of
the handshake process as well as the first encrypted packet is il-
lustrated in Figure 1. SSH-AUTH defines authentication meth-
ods such as public key, password, host based and none. After
successful authentication, a file transfer requires the establish-
ment of a secure channel to support the secure file transfer pro-
tocol as defined by. Secure file transfer (SFTP) [24] is an SSH
sub-system particularly worthy for investigation as significant
potential exists for it to transfer confidential files out of a sys-
tem.
2.2. Memory Access
Memory acquisition tools assist forensic analysis. So, for
workstation and server technologies hardware and software ac-
quisition methods exist [25]. Hardware acquisition typically
involves connecting devices, such as PCMCIA cards or USB
sticks, to a target [26] while software acquisition commonly in-
volves executing extraction programs such as FTK Imager [27],
Memoryze [28], or WinPmem [29] on the target [30]. These
solutions may not always be practical in live network session
decryption scenarios.
Android smartphone volatile memory is accessible. As
Androids run Linux, memory acquisition tools such as the
Linux Memory Extractor (’LiME’) application [31] may suf-
fice. However, LiME depends on compiled kernel modules
for the target’s Linux version, support by the smartphone and
kernel level execution. The quantity of Linux variations for
Android smartphones as well as the installation and execution
requirements may be challenging. AMExtractor [32] requires
kernel execution privilege but no compilation is required and so
is potentially less restrictive. TrustDump [33] may be appropri-
ate but minimal testing has been carried out. Commercial tools
such as Cellebrite also claim to extract memory from Android
devices without target modification although usage is restricted
[34].
Internet of Things (IoT) devices also commonly run Linux
[35]. However, device type and Linux variations pose po-
tentially greater challenges than smartphones. Nevertheless,
solutions that support live acquisition from Android smart-
watches, as well as smartphones, have been proposed [36].
IoT device memory may also be acquired by flashing mem-
ory, running Linux dump commands, or accessing device cir-
cuitry [37]. Furthermore, memory access with commercial
tools, such as Cellebrite UFED Physical Analyzer, has also
been demonstrated [38]. As IoT devices frequently commu-
nicate with cloud-based servers, memory acquisition of virtual-
ized machines may present an easier alternative [35]. Virtual-
ization enables memory access. Virtualization technologies en-
able virtual machines to share host computer resources thereby
providing an opportunity to discover cryptographic artefacts in
virtual machine memory from the physical host. This ensures
investigations have reduced the impact on virtual machine op-
erations. Furthermore, software programs executing on the vir-
tual machine, such as malware, may not detect the investiga-
tions. Examples of tools and libraries that support outsidethe-
machine monitoring include LibVMI [39] together with PyVMI
[40] and Volatility [41], and Rekall [42].
3. MemDecrypt Design
MemDecrypt consists of network and data collection, mem-
ory analysis, and decrypt analysis components. Figure 2 illus-
trates the MemDecrypt activity flow diagram. Each component
is described in the following paragraphs.
Network and Memory Extract. In MemDecrypt unusual
events trigger memory extracts. This approach is less intru-
sive than continuous memory monitoring where the monitor-
ing and analysis activities of the host may impact target device
performance. Furthermore, malware writers script programs
to be aware of monitoring activity, which would probably be
more obvious with continuous monitoring. The triggers ap-
proach is also more precise than obtaining memory snapshots
on a polled basis. Polling snapshots may miss malicious activ-
ity if the polling interval is too large, especially when malware
uses counter analysis techniques. The quantity and timing of
memory extraction events depend on the target device, the se-
cure protocol, and the encryption algorithm. Where memory is
classifiable, the read/write memory of the encryption program
is extracted for size minimization, with consequent reduced im-
pact on target performance and faster subsequent analysis.
Memory analysis. Candidate encryption keys and IVs are
identified in the memory extracts. Although largely protocol
specific, there are common features. In particular, candidate IV
locations are discovered first with approaches that encompass
an analysis of memory extracts, network packets or both net-
work packets and memory extracts. As keys and IVs are crypto-
graphic artefacts, the distance between their respective memory
locations may be small If program memory extracts are taken
when the same activity is being performed, such as the trans-
mission of outgoing messages, memory blocks containing IVs
change, while other blocks remain static.
Key randomness makes it different from many other types of
memory regions. Key randomness means that the sequence of
bits cannot be easily predicted. The randomness of keys can be
evaluated using entropy, a measure of the amount of informa-
tion in a key. This paper uses Shannon’s entropy measure for
discrete variables [43] in preference to cryptographically use-
ful alternatives such as guessing entropy and min-entropy [44]
because smaller candidate key sets are produced:
H = −
n∑
i=1
p(i) log2 p(i) (1)
where p(i) is the normalized frequency of the ith byte in the
message i.e. p(i) = f (i)/n. So, segments of high entropy user
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Figure 1: SSH Handshake Example
Figure 2: MemDecrypt Activity Flow Diagram
memory are more likely to contain the key. In contrast with
IVs, keys do not generally change during a session. So, static,
high-entropy contents are candidate encryption keys. This ob-
servation assists in improving memory analysis performance.
Decrypt analysis. Candidate keys and IVs identified in
memory analysis are used in decrypting network packets until
a valid key and IV combination has been found. Decrypt vali-
dation uses information derived from specific encrypted fields.
SSH encrypted data blocks are of the following format:
Packet Length (4 bytes) Padding Length (1 byte) Payload
(variable bytes) Padding (variable bytes) MAC
The packet length is the sum of the padding length size, the
payload, and padding fields. So, equation (2) is a good decrypt
test for many SSH messages as 2(8∗4−21) valid packet length de-
crypts are possible. The minimum SSH block size is 21 bytes
comprising a packet length of 4 bytes, a padding length of 1
byte, and the payload and padding which is at least one block.
So, the probability of an incorrect decrypt producing the correct
header data is 1-in-4,294,967,275. Reassembly is undertaken
when the SSH packet size exceeds the network packet size.
Equation (2) is sound during the authentication, channel, and
sub-service setup stages when SSH packet sizes are generally
small and a modified version is used for reassembled SSH pack-
ets. An additional test evaluates whether the decrypted padding
length meets Equation (3) as required by SSH-TRANS. Correct
decrypts are parsed to obtain SSH and SFTP fields.
packet data length =
decrypted packet length +
size(packet length f ield) +
size(MAC f ield)
(2)
4 <= padding length <= 255 (3)
4. MemDecrypt Implementation
This paper focuses on SSH decryption using AES-CTR and
AES-CBC in virtualized environments using MemDecrypt. The
following paragraphs present implementation and evaluation
details. The framework is implemented on the Xen hypervi-
sor [45]. Xen’s small trusted computing base makes it poten-
tially less prone to vulnerabilities than hypervisors with larger
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footprints. Furthermore, the LibVMI library (“LibVMI,” n.d.)
for Xen enables efficient memory access to live memory of
Windows or Linux virtual machines. As the Xen hypervisor
has minimal functionality a privileged virtual machine (Dom0)
manages the hypervisor and provides network and virtual disk
device access to other virtual machines. Network access for
the virtual machines is through a Dom0 virtual software bridge.
The MemDecrypt components either all run on, or are initiated,
from Dom0.
The MemDecrypt implementation architecture for virtualized
environments is illustrated in Figure 3. An isolated hypervisor
supports two unprivileged virtual machines, shown in the cen-
tre and right of the figure, and one privileged virtual machine
shown on the left. Test client applications execute on the virtual
machine on the right, targeting server applications executing on
the virtual machine, shown in the centre.
4.1. Data Collection
For virtualized environments, virtual machine network traffic
is inspected by redirecting each packet to a local queue using
an iptables rule and NetFilterQueue 0.8.1 [46], and analyzing
protocol fields using Scapy 2.3 [47]. When unusual activity is
detected, the component stores the network packet and decon-
structs the message. Memory is extracted for any 2 outgoing
SSH messages after a New Keys message. Linux memory ex-
traction uses PyVMI and LibVMI libraries, whereas Windows
extraction applies Volatility framework user plugins.
MemDecrypt obtains useful data from the SSH initialization
stage. Client and server versions, and application if available
are obtained from the protocol version exchange. The encryp-
tion algorithm is determined from the “Key Exchange” mes-
sages. Also, if initialization has completed, i.e. the “New Keys”
has been transmitted, user-level read/write program memory
extraction is triggered for two outgoing packets in the network
session. Memory extracts are not required for consecutive pack-
ets or to be immediately after the “New Keys” message.
4.2. Memory Analysis
Analysis approaches vary according to encryption mode and
operating system. For AES-CTR, two steps are required to dis-
cover candidate IVs and keys in memory, whereas AES-CBC
requires only key discovery. For Windows, discovery is per-
formed by iteratively analyzing multiple memory files extracted
at different times, whereas, for Linux, a single heap file is ana-
lyzed.
For AES-CTR, candidate IVs are discovered first. As IVs
increase but are likely to be located at the same memory address
over different extracts, memory blocks that change is subject
to further analysis. If the 16-byte value at a memory address
increments by the number of encrypted blocks in the previous
packet, then the address contents are a candidate IV. Supposing
that value at location p in capture y at the time a is compared
with the value at location p in capture y at time b. Then, if the
values are IVs and represented by IVpya and IVpyb respectively,
then IVpyb = IVpya +n, where n is the number of AES encrypted
network blocks that have been sent between the time a and b in
that session. For example, if the value of a 16-byte memory
block is 123456 and two network packets with, say, 10 and 5
encrypted blocks are sent and captured, then a value of 123471
at the same position in the later extract identifies a candidate
AES-CTR IV. Algorithm 1 shows the process.
Data: extract folders f ldra, f ldrb and packets pkta, pktb
Result: Z = candidate IVs
delta := blocks[pkta:pktb];
for file f1 in f ldra do
f2 = match ( f1, f ldrb);
if f1 <> f2 then
for i = 0 to size( f1) inc 4 do
if val( f2[i:i+16]) - val( f1[i:i+16]) = delta then
Z += f1[i:i+16];
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: AES-CTR IV Memory Analysis
To discover AES candidate keys for AES-CTR and AES-
CBC, the memory extract files are analysed. Key segment en-
tropies are calculated for key length segment sizes. If an en-
tropy exceeds a threshold, the segment is compared with the
equivalent segment in a later extract, and if the segments are
identical, the segment is a candidate encryption key. For exam-
ple, a 256-bit key length, a 32-byte memory segment entropy
of 4.9, and a 32-byte AES threshold of 4.65 determines the seg-
ment to be of interest. An identical match to the segment at
the same location in a later memory extract identifies a candi-
date key. The identified candidate IVs and keys provide input
to the decrypt analysis stage. Heuristic testing determined that
AES entropy thresholds of 4.65 for 256-bit keys, 4.0 for 192-bit
keys, and 3.4 for 128-bit keys ensured the inclusion of all keys
in candidate sets while minimizing set size.
4.3. Decrypt Analysis
The component iterates through each candidate key for each
candidate IV until decrypts are validated. The first ciphertext
block is decrypted for each combination with pycrypto 2.6.1
[48]. For a correct decrypt the first four plaintext bytes are
the packet length and Equation (2) holds. For additional val-
idation, the decrypted padding length is checked with Equation
(3). With a valid key and IVs, MemDecrypt decrypts each block
and deconstructs the SSH plaintext stream. For SSH authoriza-
tion requests, the ’password’ type plaintext yields the remote
user credentials and for SSH connection requests, the channel
type, and channel request decrypts. For SFTP, all plaintext is
produced including initialization, file attribute, file open, write
and close message types fields. All plaintext is written to file
for evaluation.
4.4. Testbed
The physical environment is a Core 2 Duo Dell personal
computer with 40 GB of disk storage and 3 GB of RAM. It hosts
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Figure 3: MemDecrypt Virtualization Architecture
the hypervisor, a Dom0 privileged virtual machine, an untrusted
Windows virtual machine, and an untrusted Ubuntu virtual ma-
chine. The hypervisor is Xen Project 4.4.1 and the Dom0 hy-
pervisor console is Debian release 3.16.0-4-amd64 version 1.
Tests run on Windows client and Linux server virtual ma-
chines. One client runs a standard Windows 7 SP1 operating
system with 512 MB of allocated memory and 30 GB of disk
space. Another client runs a Windows 10 (10.0.16299) oper-
ating system with 2 GB of memory and 40 GB of disk. Win-
dows operating systems support a number of SSH clients [49].
The selected PuTTY suite [23] is widely used [49] so may be
used by suspect actors. However, other SSH client applica-
tions should produce similar results. The untrusted Linux server
virtual machine runs an Ubuntu 14.04 build (“Trusty”) with
512 MB of allocated memory and 4 GB of disk storage. SSH
server functionality is provided by openssh-server. To remove
unnecessary communications with external agents, the dnsmasq
package is installed and configured to respond to DNS requests
with the server virtual machine IP address.
5. Evaluation
MemDecrypt is evaluated by running a sequence of experi-
ments. The experimental set-up is described followed by the
presentation and review of results. Possible countermeasures to
MemDecrypt results are discussed.
5.1. Experimental Set-up
Experiments are performed with variable file sizes, key
lengths, modes of operation, operating systems, and operating
system versions. In each instance, the ’pscp’ program is
executed from the Windows command line using requests of
the form:
pscp -P nnnn filename name@ipaddress:/home/name
where nnnn is the target port, filename is the file being
transmitted, name is a user account on the target Ubuntu server,
ipaddress is the target server IP address and /home/name is the
Ubuntu server target folder for the transmitted file. An Ubuntu
service is started from the bash command line to listen to client
SSH messages with requests of the form:
/usr/sbin/sshd -f /root/sshd_config -d -p nnnn
where nnnn is the service receiving port number and
sshd_config contains configuration details such as encryption
algorithms supported by the server.
Sets of experiments investigate decrypting SSH traffic en-
crypted with AES under different conditions. One set evaluates
decrypt effectiveness for Windows 7 and Windows 10 clients.
A second set evaluates the effectiveness of 128-bit, 192-bit and
256-bit keys on Windows 10 clients in AES-CTR mode. A third
set evaluates MemDecrypt effectiveness with 256-bit keys in
AES-CBC and AES-CTR modes on Windows 10 clients. To
evaluate file invariability, a fourth set uploads 30 files in text,
pdf, Excel, and executable formats between 1 KB and 500 KB
for Windows clients in AES-CTR mode using 256-bit keys. Ex-
periments also assess decrypt effectiveness with Ubuntu server
for AES-CBC and AES-CTR with 256-bit keys.
5.2. Test Results
In each experiment, encryption keys, and for AES-CTR
initialization vectors, were discovered and valid plaintext
produced for all SSH and SFTP fields. For example,
with a client command of ’pscp -P 2222 plaintext.txt pe-
ter@192.168.137.85:/home/peter’ and plaintext.txt of ’An out-
cropping of limestone beside the path that had a silhou-
ette. . . ’, the interesting decrypted fields are depicted in Figure
4. MemDecrypt also produces other SSH fields such as request
identifiers, and file offsets. As observed earlier, the probability
of an incorrect combination generating a packet length meeting
Equation (2) is 0.00000002% (1 in 4,294,967,275). MemDe-
crypt decrypts SSH traffic with a high degree of certainty.
Analysis durations for producing correct plaintext deter-
mines MemDecrypt’s usefulness. For example, if plaintext is
produced during the network session MemDecrypt can assist in
the prevention of further malicious activity, perhaps by drop-
ping packets or hijacking the session.
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Figure 4: SSH Decrypt Output
The first experiment compares the relative performance of
Windows 7 and Windows 10 client virtual machines. For
AES-CTR, two memory extracts are required for the analysis
whereas, for CBC, one extract suffices. Memory analysis typ-
ically executes for approximately nine seconds for Windows 7
clients and 16 seconds for Windows 10 clients with a maximum
of 25.1 seconds. Decrypt analysis durations varied between
0.2 and 34.1 seconds averaging at 4.5 seconds. The variance
is linked to the candidate IV set size and the ordinality of the
correct IV within the file set.
The second experiment compares analysis time durations for
different CTR key sizes on Windows 10 clients. Shorter key
lengths require lower entropy thresholds, so more candidate en-
cryption keys are discovered in-memory analysis. Figure 5 il-
lustrates a typical distribution of 32-byte entropy segments in
read/write memory. This maps the count of memory segments
exceeding an entropy with an entropy levels so that for exam-
ple whereas out of 264,813 segments exceeding 0.0 entropy,
188,602 (i.e. 72.1%) exceed 2.0, 2,628 (i.e. 0.99%) exceed 4.5.
So, for example, in one test sequence memory analysis yielded
candidate key set sizes of 272 for 256-bit key lengths, 1123 for
192-bit key lengths, and 5658 for 128-bit key lengths. With
these set sizes, decrypt analysis durations are longer for shorter
key lengths as illustrated in Figure 6.
The third experiment compares analysis time durations on
Windows 10 clients for 256-bit key sizes in AES-CTR and
AES-CBC. The CBC memory analysis takes approximately 16
seconds which is similar to CTR. However, the CBC decrypt
analysis duration is faster with a minimum of 0.07 seconds as
iterating through potential IVs is not required.
For experiments accessing Ubuntu server memory with the
default encryption algorithm, i.e. AES with 256-bit key length
and CTR mode, all client and server packets are correctly de-
crypted. The data collection component obtains process lists
and extracts process heap from the Ubuntu virtual machine in
0.3 seconds. Memory analysis finds approximately 320 keys
and 3 initialization vectors in 6 seconds, and decrypt analysis
decrypts the session successfully in 37 seconds.
MemDecrypt performance may suffice when extracts are ob-
tained for Windows clients or Ubuntu servers. Nevertheless,
strategies to enhance performance include improving memory
extraction for Windows clients, pre-testing with known SSH
client and server applications, pipelining, multi-threading, and
implementing in a low-level language instead of Python. A
custom extract engine using PyVMI and LibVMI libraries to
replace Volatility plugins improves Windows memory extrac-
tion performance. Pre-testing SSH client and server applica-
tions may determine the distance between key and IV memory
locations.
Cryptographic libraries generally request memory to hold
crypto data structures (’malloc’) when algorithms are agreed
which occurs after the handshake so data is usually on the
heap. The data structures can include fields such as encryp-
tion/decryption flag, key size, keys etc so for an algorithm,
AES-CTR with 256 bit keys, the data structures may be in-
variant. For example, with PuTTY ’pscp’, distances are 968
bytes for 256-bit and 192-bit keys and 728 bytes for 128-bit-
keys and are invariant with operating system version or trans-
mitted file size. Where the distance is known, and the program
identified from the SSH version message, memory analysis and
decrypt analysis components take one second. Multi-threading
supports simultaneous analysis of multiple files and decrypts
while pipelining between components enables analysis to ter-
minate when the correct plaintext is obtained.
So, MemDecrypt decrypts SSH sessions with high probabil-
ity independent of file size, operating system type or version,
key length, or mode. Furthermore, with SSH application pre-
testing, analysis and decrypt decryption completes in 1 second.
With unknown SSH applications, the plaintext is produced in
under 60 seconds for 192-bit and 256-bit keys. Although in ex-
periments, MemDecrypt decrypts sessions with exfiltrated files
of 100 bytes, the risk exists that extracts are not acquired in
terse SSH sessions. The risk might be mitigated by pausing the
virtual machine. Decrypting sessions with SSH key rotation
[50] is not currently implemented but the planned MemDecrypt
approach is considering each rotation as a separate session with
its own candidate keys and IVs.
5.3. Countermeasures
Countermeasures may prevent or delay MemDecrypt discov-
ery of cryptographic artefacts. Invalid assumptions can invali-
date the methodology. Candidate encryption keys are assumed
to be high entropy, static for a network session, and in the same
memory location. For entropy, less randomness, i.e. lower en-
tropy, makes key regions less evident but key unpredictability
is an essential requirement. For key staticity, MemDecrypt re-
quires two extractions for AES-CTR, key changes would be re-
quired between each outgoing packet which could cause ex-
cessive transmission delays. Key location changes could delay
decryption. However, tests on a Linux heap extract produced
delays of less than 0.5 seconds. MemDecrypt assumes candi-
date AES-CTR IVs are located at the same memory locations
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Figure 6: Key Length Analysis Durations
in each extract and values to increment by the sum of payload
blocks in the previous packets. As with keys, tests where IV
memory addresses changed induced delay of 0.5 seconds. As
a result, the measure may not suffice. AES-CTR IVs incre-
ments make them detectable when stored in the clear in mem-
ory. Another delaying measure is encrypting artefacts with an
additional key. However, this key may be discoverable, and
furthermore, the additional encryption and decryption for each
packet, or block, may have an unacceptable performance im-
pact. Obfuscation the artefacts may be more effective. For
example, splitting key and IV strings and interpolating vari-
able data between splits will limit MemDecrypt performance,
and possibly effectiveness. This technique is faster and less de-
tectable than an additional encryption layer. A more effective
counter-measure is preventing memory access to artefacts. For
example, Intel [51] and AMD [52] may develop virtual ma-
chine encryption where encryption keys are absent from virtual
machine memory. Although this can offer privacy, malicious
behaviour is then hidden so administrators may seek to disable
the feature.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
The MemDecrypt framework rapidly discovers crypto-
graphic artefacts and decrypts SSH communications in virtual-
ized environments. This can assist in detecting, and preventing
insider attackers from extracting and encrypting confidential in-
formation to external locations. MemDecrypt can be extended
to technologies where memory acquisition of live secure ses-
sions is enabled. Decrypting SSH sessions may be illegal with-
out approval so cryptographic artefact sets could be retained
with the associated network traffic for decryption once approval
is obtained. High performance makes the framework applicable
so future work should apply multithreading and pipelining tech-
niques before being extended to other non-virtualized use cases,
secure protocols, encryption algorithms, and malware that use
encrypted communications channels.
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